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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

EXPANDING PATIENT ACCESS TO BREAST CANCER GENETIC
TESTING THROUGH INCENTIVE REGIMES
ABSTRACT
It is estimated that 268,600 women were diagnosed with breast cancer in
2019 alone, and as many as 26,860 of these women could have developed breast
cancer due to a genetic disposition. 1 While over one million women have
undergone genetic testing to identify variations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,
the test results are often ambiguous due to identified variations for which the
breast cancer development risk is unknown. 2 A new technology known as
CRISPR has the potential to change this state of uncertainty due to its capability
to identify thousands of BRCA1 and 2 gene variations and accurately predict the
associated breast cancer development risk. 3 However, access to this innovative
technology for the accurate classification of breast cancer predictors has been
impeded by the emergence of proprietary rights over breast cancer predictors
and the inconsistent regulation of genetic testing by the Food and Drug
Administration. This article proposes a single regulatory pathway for all genetic
tests that requires clinical validity for approval, allowing the use of technology
such as CRISPR to supplement clinical patient data with accurate laboratory
data. This proposal provides incentives for companies to enter the genetic
testing market, making breast cancer predictors available to the women who
need them.

1. Breast Cancer Facts & Figures 2019-2020, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (2019), https://www.can
cer.org/content/dam/cancer-org/research/cancer-facts-and-statistics/breast-cancer-facts-and-fig
ures/breast-cancer-facts-and-figures-2019-2020.pdf; Tamsen Valoir, Breast Cancer, Politics, and
Patents, 44 AIPLA Q. J. 63, 73 (2016).
2. Jay Shendure et al., What CRISPR Genome Editing Means for BRCA Breast Cancer
Testing, INVERSE (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/49465-what-crispr-genome-edit
ing-means-for-breast-cancer-research.
3. Sarah Zhang, With CRISPR, Scientists Engineered Nearly 4,000 Mutations of a BreastCancer Gene, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018
/09/4000-brca1-variants/569827/.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A woman in the United States has a one in eight chance of developing breast
cancer in her lifetime. 4 Of the women who develop breast cancer, five to ten
percent are more likely to have developed breast cancer due to a genetic
disposition related to a variation in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 5 However, a
significant number of identified BRCA gene variations have not been classified
as breast cancer predictors due to the unknown breast cancer development risk
associated with these variations. 6 There is a new technology that has the
capability to not only identify the complete range of BRCA gene variations but
to also accurately classify these variations as breast cancer predictors. 7 This
emerging technology, called CRISPR, is a gene-editing technology. 8 However,
as this Article will demonstrate, there are two phenomena that are likely to
hinder the application of CRISPR to breast cancer predictors, rendering the
development and availability of this technology problematic. The first is the
level of incentives in the form of proprietary rights, and the second is regulatory
uncertainty. In order for women to benefit from this technology, companies need
to enter the genetic testing market so that this technological advance can be used
to make breast cancer predictors accessible.
Proprietary rights through patent protection, the first phenomena, is the
default incentive regime to innovation. 9 Thus, innovation hinges on the
patentability of genes and genetic tests. The problem is that the Supreme Court
has held that genes and genetic tests are not eligible for patent protection, based
on the finding that an isolated deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) segment is a
naturally occurring product that is not made by man. 10 Trade secrecy is also a
factor in this area because it operates separately from patent protection. 11 As an
example, due to the exclusiveness of these two systems, the company that held
the only BRCA gene patents developed a proprietary breast cancer predictor
database and this trade secret was not impacted by the invalidation of the
patents. 12 This results in an even higher proprietary rights barrier for companies
4. Breast Cancer Risk in American Women, NAT’L CANCER INST., (last updated Oct. 3,
2019).
5. Valoir, supra note 1.
6. Anny Huang, FDA Regulation of Genetic Testing: Institutional Reluctance and Public
Guardianship, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555, 566–67 (1998).
7. Zhang, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. While there are alternative incentive regimes to innovation, this article focuses on patent
protection because it is the primary mechanism of innovation in the United States. See Daniel J.
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L.R. 303, 311–12
(2013) (explaining that incentive regimes include patents as well as prizes, government grants to
offset research and development cost, and tax incentives).
10. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980).
11. Valoir, supra note 1 at 98.
12. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

EXPANDING PATIENT ACCESS TO BREAST CANCER GENETIC TESTING

165

looking to enter the genetic testing market, a consequence of the inability to
exclude others via patent protection as well as the significant disadvantage
companies have in classifying identified BRCA gene variations without the use
of the largest repository of breast cancer predictor patient data. 13 The ultimate
consequence is the negative impact on women’s access to breast cancer
predictors. 14
Regulation, the second phenomena, is the method by which the FDA
oversees the safety and effectiveness of genetic tests. 15 The FDA has the
authority to regulate genetic tests as medical devices because the tests are used
in the diagnosis and prevention of disease. 16 There are stark differences in the
validity required for FDA approval of genetic tests based on the method of test
administration, either administration by the laboratory that created the test or by
a laboratory following a purchase from the manufacturer. 17 These regulation
differences hinder the accessibility of breast cancer predictors because
companies must contend with regulatory uncertainty, which can impede market
entry. 18 Even the introduction of direct-to-consumer genetic tests did not
improve breast cancer predictor accessibility, as this third method of test
administration only further complicated the regulation. 19
If one out of every eight women in the United States is at risk of developing
breast cancer, there certainly is a significant number of women who would
benefit from access to breast cancer predictors in order to identify treatment
options before it is too late. 20 While CRISPR has made more comprehensive and
accurate genetic testing a reality, women cannot benefit from this technology if
companies do not market genetic testing that utilizes the full range of breast
cancer predictors. 21 In order to overcome the impediments to breast cancer
predictor accessibility, proprietary rights and regulation, a uniform regulatory
pathway for genetic testing is needed that requires proof and disclosure of
clinical validity to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the genetic tests. This
Article argues that the FDA must establish a single regulatory pathway for
genetic testing, balancing the requirement of clinical validity with the
supplementation of patient data by technologies such as CRISPR in order to
13. Id. at 101.
14. Id. at 109.
15. FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (last updated Feb. 9, 2018).
16. Suneel Arora et al., The Interplay between FDA and Patent Law: Infusing Organizational
Knowledge for Medical Device Companies, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1176, 1177 (2013); Patricia
J. Zettler et al., 23andMe, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Future of Genetic Testing,
174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 493, 493 (Apr. 2014).
17. See Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth R. Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 702–03 (2014).
18. See id. at 703.
19. See id. at 705.
20. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 5.
21. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 691.
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overcome the inaccessibility of breast cancer predictors due to proprietary rights
protection.
Part II of this Article starts by outlining the reasons breast cancer predictors
are not only relevant but also crucial for the medical treatment of women. This
is followed by a discussion of how proprietary rights over breast cancer
predictors emerged in the form of patent case law, leading to a substantial
decrease in available patent protection for genetic tests, and a discussion of how
the regulation of genetic tests is inconsistent. The discussion of both of these
issues will illustrate how a lack of incentive for companies to enter the genetic
testing market ultimately results in inaccessibility of breast cancer predictors.
Part III of this Article analyzes how trade secrecy and the introduction of
direct-to-consumer genetic tests have further impeded breast cancer predictor
accessibility. This analysis starts with an assessment of how, even though patent
protection over genetic tests has been substantially reduced, trade secrecy
continues to disadvantage companies that lack years of patient data for
establishing clinical validity. This is followed by an analysis of the complication
of genetic testing regulation by the advent of direct-to-consumer tests,
highlighting the negative impact of regulation variability on breast cancer
predictor accessibility.
Part IV proposes a novel solution that draws on existing literature to promote
accessibility of breast cancer predictors: a single regulatory pathway for all
genetic tests that requires clinical validity for FDA approval regardless of the
method of test administration. This clinical testing requirement is balanced by
the utilization of technology such as CRISPR to supplement patient clinical data
with accurate laboratory data, incentivizing companies to enter the genetic
testing market so that breast cancer predictors are accessible to the women who
need them.
II. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS AND REGULATION OF BREAST CANCER PREDICTORS
A.

Relevance of Breast Cancer Predictors

DNA is a genetic sequence that is formed by pairs of nucleotide bases, the
order of which determines the structure and hereditary material of a living
organism. 22 The complete DNA sequence is known as the genome and contains
approximately 20,000 to 25,000 genes, located on chromosomes in the nucleus
of each human cell. 23 The purpose of genetic testing is to identify variations in
human genes that are linked to a genetic disease, in order to determine whether
an individual is at an increased risk of disease development. 24 Specific to breast
22. What is DNA? U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (June 23, 2020).
23. A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., (last updated Nov. 7,
2019).
24. Huang, supra note 7, at 555.
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cancer, women who undergo genetic testing are interested in determining
whether they have a breast cancer predictor, a BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene variation
that is associated with breast cancer development. 25 The BRCA genes impede
tumor growth in breast cells and women want to know if they are at risk of a
breast cancer predictor suppressing these genes. 26 The BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes were discovered in 1990 and 1995 respectively, and the significance of
this discovery was the identification of risk predictors for a disease that scientists
understood to be hereditary without knowing the genes that indicated a risk. 27
Myriad Genetics, Inc., discovered the precise location of the BRCA2 gene,
which allowed Myriad to not only determine the nucleotide sequence but to also
use this sequence information in order to develop medical tests for the detection
of breast cancer predictors. 28
Although this information can be extremely helpful to patients in making
treatment decisions, genetic testing provides only an estimate of the probability
of genetic disease development because gene expression is a factor of
inheritance and of an individual’s environment. 29 This is further complicated by
the fact that there are identified gene variations for which the genetic disease
risk is not known, making these “variants of unknown significance,” or VUS. 30
As technology has advanced, allowing for large portions of DNA to be
sequenced quickly, the scientific understanding of the significance of gene
variations has been outpaced by technological discovery. 31 The BRCA1 gene is
an illuminating example, as there are still thousands of VUS despite the
pervasiveness of research. 32 The consequence of this uncertainty is that women
are making the private decision to undergo genetic testing for breast cancer
predictors, understanding that the test results could be emotionally challenging,
without the confidence that the results will be meaningful. 33 Based on test
results, a woman might choose to have a double mastectomy, or even to not have
children to avoid the risk of passing on the gene, decisions that would be made
based on uncertain test results. 34
The emergence of a new technology, called CRISPR, introduced the
capability to not only identify thousands of BRCA gene variations but to also

25. Id. at 567.
26. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 583 (2013).
27. Jacob S. Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, The History of Patenting Genetic Material, 49 ANN.
REV. GENETICS 161, 172 (2015); Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. at 583.
28. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. at 583.
29. See Huang, supra note 7, at 564–65.
30. Zhang, supra note 3.
31. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 685.
32. Zhang, supra note 3.
33. Huang, supra note 7, at 567–68.
34. Id.
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accurately classify these variations as breast cancer predictors. 35 CRISPR is a
gene-editing technology that enables scientists to edit the DNA of human cells,
using the Cas9 enzyme as “molecular scissors” to cut and modify DNA. 36 Before
CRISPR, scientists had spent decades attempting to catalog the many variations
of the BRCA gene in order to classify the variations as breast cancer predictors. 37
As the BRCA1 gene sequence is 5,600 nucleotide bases in length, the process of
looking at only one variation at a time would have taken decades. 38 The CRISPR
technology radically changed this approach, allowing scientists to genetically
engineer 3,893 BRCA1 variations in a single study, based on only twenty-five
percent of the BRCA1 coding sequence. 39 This is already a significant increase
from the 1,800 BRCA1 variations that had been identified as of 2016, and this
doesn’t include the potential thousands of additional variations that could result
from the analysis of the remaining seventy-five percent of the BRCA1 coding
sequence. 40
Even more importantly, CRISPR is yielding accurate disease development
risk prediction results. 41 An early comparison of the risk prediction accuracy of
variations identified by CRISPR with those BRCA1 variants for which patient
data was already available is yielding an almost exact match. 42 This means that
CRISPR not only has the capability to identify BRCA gene variations but to also
turn these identified variations into accurate breast cancer predictors. With the
potential to significantly decrease the number of women who receive genetic
testing results of unknown significance, which is as many as 5 out of 100 tested
women today, it is crucial to make the CRISPR technology accessible to the
women who need more comprehensive and accurate breast cancer genetic
testing. 43 In order for women to have this access, companies will need to
navigate different layers of legal and regulatory frameworks.
B.

Emergence of Proprietary Rights over Breast Cancer Predictors

In order to incentivize inventors to engage in costly and time-consuming
research and development, as well as to produce socially valuable information,
the patent system provides exclusivity of an invention to allow inventors to

35. Zhang, supra note 3.
36. STEPHAN RIXEN, BETWEEN MORAL HAZARD AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 18 (Matthias
Braun et al. eds., 2018).
37. Zhang, supra note 3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Valoir, supra note 1, at 76.
41. Shendure et al., supra note 2.
42. Id.
43. See Zhang, supra note 3.
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recover the innovation cost. 44 Patent protection originated with the U.S.
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 45 An invention
must meet three requirements in order to be eligible for patent protection. 46 First,
an invention must be useful, meaning it is classified as a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.” 47 Second, an invention must be novel,
indicating it is the first of its kind to be patented.48 Third, an invention must be
nonobvious, signifying it is sufficiently different from any prior inventions to
not be obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.” 49
The application of these requirements to biological material occurred in
1980, when the case Diamond v. Chakrabarty came before the Supreme Court
for resolution of whether a human-made micro-organism was eligible for patent
protection. 50 Chakrabarty’s patent application for a human-made bacterium was
rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on the grounds that
the created micro-organism was a “product of nature.” 51 This rejection was
based on precedent that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable subject matter, because a micro-organism, like the
discovery of a new mineral or Newton’s discovery of the law of gravity, is a
discovery of a manifestation of nature that is “free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.” 52 The USPTO reasoned that because a micro-organism
exists in nature, purification alone does not make it a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” as required to meet the usefulness
requirement. 53 Chakrabarty appealed to the Patent Office Board of Appeals but
the Board affirmed the rejection, maintaining that the usefulness requirement
does not incorporate living things. 54

44. In addition to recouping research and development costs, the exclusivity granted by patent
protection also accounts for the cost of previous failed invention iterations. Roland E. Dukes et al.,
Accounting for Research and Development Costs: The Impact on Research and Development
Expenditures, 18 J. ACCT. RES.1, 1–2 (1980). See Sherkow & Greely, supra note 28, at 162. See
also Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 117–
18 (2016).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. Sherkow & Greely, supra note 28, at 163.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
48. See id. § 102.
49. Id. § 103.
50. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
51. Id. at 306.
52. Id. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
53. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306; 35 U.S.C. § 101.
54. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306.
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In reviewing the Board’s decision, the Supreme Court focused on whether
Chakrabarty’s micro-organism was covered by a “manufacture” or
“composition of matter” classification. 55 The Court interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101
to include “anything under the sun that is made by man,” holding that the microorganism was patent eligible because it had been created by Chakrabarty to have
“markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.” 56 As
Chakrabarty’s invention was “not nature’s handiwork, but his own,” it was
patentable subject matter because it was not a “product of nature.” 57 Based on
this case, the USPTO decided that isolated and purified DNA was eligible for
patent protection because the separation of DNA from the cell environment, like
the creation of a micro-organism in a laboratory, created a product that was
sufficiently different from the natural product to no longer be a manifestation of
nature. 58 This USPTO decision led to the issuance of thousands of patents for
genetic material that had been isolated from the cell environment, including
patents for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 59
Myriad Genetics, the discoverer of the BRCA2 gene, was granted patent
protection for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in 1998. 60 The patents included
composition claims, detailing the DNA nucleotide sequences that cause a cell to
produce specific BRCA1 and BRCA2 variations, and method claims, detailing
the isolation of the DNA sequences contained in the composition claims. 61
Collectively, these patent claims distinguished Myriad as the sole holder of the
right to isolate the DNA sequences contained in the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes. 62 This allowed Myriad to enforce its BRCA gene patents against any
other company that was conducting breast cancer genetic testing because genetic
testing requires the isolation of DNA sequences. 63 In light of these patent
challenges, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a suit in 2009 against
Myriad in federal district court, alleging that Myriad’s patents were invalid as
patents for “products of nature” under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 64 By filing this suit, the
petitioners hoped to invalidate Myriad’s patents, which would in turn allow other
55. Id. at 307.
56. Id. at 309–10.
57. Id. at 310.
58. Valoir, supra note 1, at 81.
59. Id. at 81–82.
60. Sherkow & Greely, supra note 28, at 172.
61. A patent composition claim covers a mixture of two or more substances, the combination
of which creates composition properties not held by the substances when separate. WILLIAM C.
ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 278 (1890). A patent method claim, also
known as a process claim, covers the steps required to bring about a specific result. Id. at 230. See
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 584 (2013). See also Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1239, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
62. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. at 585.
63. Id.
64. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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companies to isolate BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequences in the process of
conducting breast cancer genetic testing. 65
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioners for
the composition claims, holding that the claims were invalid as “products of
nature.” 66 However, the Federal Circuit reversed based on the above-mentioned
holding in Chakrabarty, reasoning that isolated DNA is not a product of nature
because it consists of “molecules that are markedly different – have a distinctive
chemical identity and nature – from molecules that exist in nature.” 67 After
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the
case to the Federal Circuit for a decision consistent with the newly decided Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 68
The Court in Mayo recognized that while a law of nature is not patentable,
an application of it could be eligible for patent protection if the application
transforms “unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those
laws.” 69 This means that if a law of nature, as applied, is sufficiently different
from the product as found in nature, it can be eligible for patent protection. The
Court held that the patent method claims at issue did not meet this standard
because the process steps involved “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.” 70
On remand, the analysis of the BRCA patents was expanded to look at not
only whether the composition claims covered products of nature, but also
whether the composition claims were transformed by the method claims into
patent-eligible subject matter. 71 The Federal Circuit held that the isolated
BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequence claims were eligible for patent protection
because “the act of isolating DNA … is an inventive act that entitles the
individual who first isolates it to a patent.” 72 When the case again reached the
Supreme Court, the Court reversed and unanimously held that “a naturally
occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and [is] not patent eligible merely
because it has been isolated.” 73
The Supreme Court’s holding that genes and genetic tests are not eligible
for patent protection has significant consequences for companies in the genetic
testing market. 74 Without the ability to exclude others from a potential genetic
testing invention via patent protection, it can be assumed under contemporary
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 369.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1239, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902 (2012).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
Id. at 73.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2013).
Id. at 580.
See id. at 585.
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intellectual property regimes that companies will lack the incentive to produce
innovative genetics tests that are valuable to society. 75 However, patent
protection does not work alone in the field of innovation. While patent protection
encourages inventiveness, public health regulation encourages the production of
inventive data during the progression from idea to market. 76 The problem is that
the lack of regulatory uniformity is impeding companies from entering the
genetic testing market, resulting in a lack of access to innovation for patients. 77
C. Inconsistent Regulation of Breast Cancer Predictors
In order for these products to be made available to patients, the product must
be approved by the FDA. 78 The FDA is a regulatory agency that is part of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and is tasked with assuring the
safety and effectiveness of drugs, biological products, and medical devices. 79
Congress authorized the FDA to regulate medical devices, products that are
“intended for use in the diagnosis … or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease,” with the passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act in 1938. 80 This empowered the FDA to monitor medical devices
that are on the market in order to identify potential risks to patient safety and
track adverse patient events. 81 The passage of the Medical Device Amendments
in 1976 expanded FDA oversight of medical devices, authorizing the FDA to
enforce safety and effectiveness standards that medical devices must meet before
being placed on the market. 82
Since genetic tests are used in the diagnosis and prevention of disease, the
FDA regulates these tests as medical devices. 83 Depending on how a genetic test
is produced and marketed, it can be regulated as either an in vitro diagnostic
device (IVD) or a laboratory developed test (LDT). 84 IVDs are “reagents,
instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure,
mitigate, treat, or prevent disease” and as such, are “intended for use in the
75. See Laakmann, supra note 45, at 118.
76. Id. at 119.
77. See Kirk Willmarth, The FDA and Genetic Testing: Improper Tools for a Difficult
Problem, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 158, 164 (2015).
78. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 16.
79. Id.
80. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); John E. Meyer, The
Future of the FDA’s Application of Enforcement Discretion on Laboratory Developed Tests, 12 J.
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 43, 47 (2019).
81. See Regulatory Controls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/overview-device-regulation/regulatory-controls (last updated Mar. 27, 2018).
82. Meyer, supra note 81.
83. Zettler et al., supra note 17.
84. Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test Innovation and Access, 9
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 393 (2011).
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collection, preparation, and examination of specimens taken from the human
body.” 85 A genetic test is classified as an IVD when it is manufactured by a
company and then purchased by a laboratory to be used for testing. 86 LDTs are
a category of IVDs and a genetic test is classified as an LDT when it is
manufactured and used by the same laboratory. 87
For a consumer, the main difference between IVDs and LDTs is how each
is regulated by the FDA, as there is a significant difference in the standards that
must be met before being placed on the market. 88 The FDA plays a direct role
in the regulation of IVDs, requiring proof of both analytic and clinical validity. 89
As related to genetic testing, analytic validity is proof that a test correctly
identifies gene variations and clinical validity is proof that a test accurately
reports the predictions of disease development risk that correlate to those
variations. 90 The level of review of IVDs, as medical devices, is contingent on
the device classification assigned by the FDA. 91 Medical devices can be
classified as Class I, Class II, or Class III, based on the risk the device could
pose to the consumer. 92 Increased risk to the consumer requires additional
oversight by the FDA in order to assure the public’s safety, with Class III being
the highest risk class. 93 Genetic tests have been classified as either Class II or
Class III, both of which can require costly clinical testing and submission of
clinical data for evaluation prior to FDA approval and subsequent market
placement. 94
LDTs, on the other hand, have historically been regulated by the FDA only
at its discretion because LDTs are also regulated by the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) via the Clinical Laboratories Improvements
Amendments Act (CLIA). 95 Congress passed CLIA in 1988, authorizing CMS
to regulate laboratory tests that are conducted on human subjects for nonresearch purposes. 96 Under CLIA, CMS requires proof of only analytic validity,
focusing on the reliability of the laboratory performing the LDT, as compared
to the requirement of analytic and clinical validity for IVDs. 97 This means that
a genetic test classified as an LDT only requires proof that the test correctly
85. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2019).
86. Robertson, supra note 85, at 394.
87. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 702.
88. Robertson, supra note 85, at 394.
89. Zettler et al., supra note 17, at 493–94.
90. Id. at 493.
91. Huang, supra note 7, at 587–88.
92. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 699.
93. Id.
94. Gail H. Javitt, In Search of a Coherent Framework: Options for FDA Oversight of Genetic
Tests, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 617, 629–30 (2007); Meyer, supra note 81, at 48–49.
95. Meyer, supra note 81, at 45–46.
96. Id. at 56.
97. Id. at 56–57.
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identifies gene variations, with no requirement of proof that the test accurately
reports the predictions of disease development risk that correlate to those
variations. 98
The stark differences between regulating a genetic test as an IVD or an LDT
illustrate how patient access to genetic testing is hindered by the variability in
regulation, as this makes it difficult for companies to determine the validity data
required for FDA approval. This decision might then impact the choice of
whether to enter the genetic testing market. 99 The resulting negative impact on
women’s access to breast cancer predictors is in addition to the access barrier
created by the lack of proprietary rights for genes and genetic tests. 100 This
Article will first analyze these two legal considerations separately, illustrating
that the lack of impact of the Myriad holding on the trade secrecy of its breast
cancer predictor data, as considered with the inconsistent regulation by the FDA
following the introduction of direct-to-consumer genetic tests, presents an
urgent issue that is difficult to ignore. This Article will then propose a solution
that promotes accessibility of breast cancer predictors, a single regulatory
pathway for all genetic tests that requires both proof and transparency of clinical
validity data.
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO WOMEN BENEFITTING FROM BREAST CANCER
PREDICTORS
A.

Problematic Trade Secrecy of Breast Cancer Predictors

As discussed, the case law history of Myriad’s BRCA gene patents
established that genes and genetic tests are not eligible for patent protection. 101
Due to the invalidation of its patents, Myriad no longer can exclude other
companies from entering the breast cancer genetic testing market. 102 However,
these other potential companies are at an extreme disadvantage. Although the
holding in Myriad addressed the patentability of genes and genetic tests, it did
not impact the trade secrecy of BRCA gene variations known exclusively to
Myriad. 103 As the holder of the only BRCA gene patents, Myriad was the
primary provider of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic tests for sixteen years,
allowing Myriad to accumulate patient data on identified BRCA gene
variations. 104 The consequence of this data monopolization was that Myriad was
the only company that had sufficient data on identified BRCA gene variations

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Zettler et al., supra note 17, at 493–94.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013).
See id. at 585.
Valoir, supra note 1, at 98.
Id. at 96.
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to turn these variations into accurate breast cancer predictors. 105 This placed
Myriad in a position to offer superior breast cancer genetic testing as compared
to its competitors because the collection of patient data for sixteen years allowed
Myriad to offer a more comprehensive breast cancer development risk
analysis. 106
While patents and trade secrecy share the same goal of encouraging
invention, the incentives offered by these two systems remain separate. 107 In
contrast to the federal patent system, trade secrecy operates at the state level. 108
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been implemented in forty-seven U.S. states
and protects information as a trade secret if it is valuable for competition, subject
to reasonable efforts of confidentiality, and not generally known by others in the
trade. 109 The Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co. that
inventions that are eligible for patent protection can also be classified as trade
secrets, stating that “the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed
by the existence of another form of incentive to invention.” 110 Based on the
Court’s conclusion that the patent and trade secrecy regimes are not in conflict,
Myriad’s proprietary breast cancer predictor data can be protected as a trade
secret even though its patents have been invalidated. 111
Myriad’s monopolization of breast cancer predictor data is significant when
considered as a vital source of data to help classify the nearly 4,000 BRCA1
gene variations discovered thus far by CRISPR. 112 While an initial analysis of
the breast cancer development risk of these variations has been completed,
yielding accurate results, the medical community remains hesitant to base
patient treatment decisions on only laboratory data. 113 While the CRISPR
technology has the potential to bridge the gap between the interest of women in
undergoing breast cancer genetic testing and the need for accurate breast cancer
predictors, women cannot utilize the comprehensive genetic testing made
possible by CRISPR without doctor endorsement. 114 If the only alternative to
laboratory data to classify breast cancer predictors is patient data, companies
will be forced to conduct years of clinical testing in order to collect patient data

105. Id.
106. Id. at 96–97.
107. Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 5 (2008).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2. See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 372 (1990).
110. Jorda, supra note 108; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
111. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 484. See also Conley et al., supra note 4, at 616.
112. Zhang, supra note 3.
113. Gregory M. Findlay et al., Accurate Classification of BRCA1 Variants with Saturation
Genome Editing, 562 NATURE 217, 221 (Oct. 2018); Zhang, supra note 3.
114. Zhang, supra note 3.
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that is likely duplicative of the data already known to Myriad. 115 This is in direct
conflict with the reality that women simply do not have the luxury of waiting.
B.

Complication of Breast Cancer Predictor Regulation Due to Direct-toConsumer Tests

Historically, women have undergone breast cancer genetic testing as
administered by either a physician or a laboratory technician. 116 As noted above,
companies must grapple with the differing standards in genetic test regulation
based on a classification of a genetic test as either an IVD or an LDT. 117
Companies are now faced with an additional potential classification for when a
woman decides to conduct the genetic test herself, using a direct-to-consumer
(DTC) test. 118 The regulation of breast cancer predictors was already uncertain
and the new classification of genetic tests by administration method instead of
risk further complicates an already inconsistent regulatory environment. 119
Following the FDA approval of the first breast cancer predictor DTC test in
2018 for the company 23andMe, women gained the option to use a DTC test for
three specific BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene variations. 120 This approval came four
years after the FDA issued a draft guidance for the regulation of LDTs that far
from clarified the regulatory standards applicable to DTC tests. 121 The FDA
decided that, even if a DTC test met the definition of an LDT, enforcement
discretion would not be exercised and the FDA would regulate all DTC tests as
IVDs. 122 The practical implication of this decision is that companies that create
and market DTC tests will be required to prove both analytic and clinical validity
in order to obtain FDA approval, as opposed to only analytic validity as required
for LDTs. 123 While classifying DTC tests as IVDs means that the FDA has
recognized the increased risk of DTC tests due to patients making their own
treatment decisions, the requirement of clinical validity for DTC tests
emphasizes the contrast between IVDs and LDTs. 124
Notwithstanding the advent of DTC tests, there are still 11,000 laboratories
in the United States that are authorized to perform LDTs. 125 It is well recognized

115. Id.
116. BRCA Gene Test for Breast and Ovarian Cancer Risk, MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 19, 2019).
117. Robertson, supra note 85, at 394.
118. FDA Authorizes, With Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three
Mutations in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2018).
119. Willmarth, supra note 78, at 159.
120. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 119.
121. Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs) Draft
Guidance, 79 Fed. Reg. 59776 (Sept. 30, 2014).
122. Id.
123. Zettler et al., supra note 17, at 494.
124. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 705.
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that without requiring clinical validity prior to FDA approval, a genetic test
classified as an LDT is at risk of producing inaccurate or misleading results. 126
Even the FDA has acknowledged that the public needs increased oversight of
LDTs in order to ensure genetic tests are accurate and reliable. 127 Yet, the FDA
has only issued two draft guidance documents regarding the discretionary
regulation of LDTs, both in 2014, prior to the 2017 publication of a discussion
paper stating that a final guidance would not be issued. 128 While this discussion
paper mentions a focus on clinical validity, showing that the FDA is aware of
the regulatory standards gap between IVDs, including DTC tests, and LDTs, the
discussion paper is merely a suggestion as opposed to binding FDA
regulation. 129
Women need to be confident that the choice to undergo breast cancer genetic
testing will yield results that accurately reflect not only the identified BRCA
gene variations but also any present breast cancer predictors. It is hard to see
how women can have this confidence when making the choice between testing
performed by a doctor, a laboratory technician, or at home can change the
validity of the results. Thus, a defined regulatory pathway for breast cancer
genetic testing is needed for both the women who are at risk of developing the
disease and the health care providers responsible for advising these women of
their treatment options. This becomes even more crucial in light of the
exponential increase in the number of BRCA gene variations discovered thus far
by CRISPR. 130 This regulatory pathway needs to balance the need for clinical
validity for each variant with the understanding of how making this approval
requirement too onerous might make genetic testing an impracticable pursuit
due to the required time and company resources. 131 The proposal that follows
combines this need for a single regulatory pathway with the reality of the
unavailability of breast cancer predictor patient data due to trade secrecy,
balancing a requirement for clinical validity for all genetic tests with the use of
technology such as CRISPR to supplement patient clinical data.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE GENETIC TESTING TO PROMOTE
ACCESSIBILITY OF BREAST CANCER PREDICTORS
In order for women to gain access to breast cancer predictors, companies
need to have incentives to enter the genetic testing market. The following
analysis details a proposed solution to grant women this needed access. This

126. Meyer, supra note 81, at 57.
127. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DISCUSSION PAPER ON LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS
(LDTS) 2 (2017).
128. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 18, at 703; Meyer, supra note 81, at 62, 65.
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proposal is for a single regulatory pathway for all genetic tests that balances the
requirement of clinical validity with the supplementation of patient data, by
technology such as CRISPR, in order to overcome the inaccessibility of breast
cancer predictors due to proprietary rights protection.
The first component of the proposed regulatory pathway is a requirement for
clinical validity for both LDTs and IVDs, including DTC tests. The FDA could
pursue this requirement in two ways – it could regulate all genetic testing as
IVDs, thereby requiring clinical validity prior to FDA approval, or it could
require proof of clinical validity for LDTs. 132 Both of these options would result
in a uniform approach for all genetic tests that requires both analytic and clinical
validity prior to FDA approval. This would allow women to feel confident in
their breast cancer genetic testing results, as all genetic tests would be required
to prove not only the correct identification of BRCA gene variations but also the
accurate predictions of disease development risk correlated with those
variations. 133 Without the standardized requirement of clinical validity, genetic
tests are at risk of producing inaccurate and misleading results due to the lack of
FDA oversight. 134 There is simply too much at stake to allow for even the
possibility of inaccurate results considering the private and personal treatment
decisions women are making based on the test results. 135
While these two options are both viable, the FDA has implied that it is open
to requiring clinical validity for LDTs. 136 This is because this route would
provide an impartial confirmation of the quality of genetic test results, providing
assurance the test works as intended. 137 Although it could be argued that
uniformity of validity data in this instance is minimizing the uniqueness of
LDTs, a product that might be better off with product-specific regulation, the
FDA itself has acknowledged that heightened oversight of LDTs is needed in
order to ensure test accuracy. 138 In addition, while some LDT advocates have
expressed concerns that requiring clinical validity for LDTs would duplicate
CLIA regulation efforts by CMS, the FDA has stated that this requirement would
be complementary to, and not duplicative of, CMS regulation requirements. 139
This suggests that the FDA is willing to keep both the LDT and IVD
classifications for genetic tests and that this route will best meet the breast cancer
predictor accessibility needs of women.
If clinical validity is required for all genetic tests, companies will need to
know what data can be used to meet this requirement in order to bring genetic
132.
133.
134.
135.
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137.
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139.
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tests to the patients who need them. While the FDA has historically required
patient data, it stated in 2017 that it was willing to consider clinical validity that
is “supported by literature, well-curated databases, or other appropriate sources
that meet the valid scientific evidence standard.” 140 As applied to breast cancer
genetic testing, this could mean that studies performed with CRISPR might be
an option to classify identified BRCA gene variations as breast cancer
predictors, as opposed to needing actual patient data for this classification. The
use of scientific data to supplement patient data also offsets the significant
clinical testing costs that can be incurred by companies, helping to incentivize
companies to pursue the genetic testing market. 141 This is even more salient due
to Myriad’s monopolization of breast cancer predictor patient data. 142 The
availability of scientific data has the potential to decrease the time and cost of
clinical validity data collection significantly, as illustrated by the single study
that identified nearly 4,000 BRCA1 gene variations and accurately classified
these variations as breast cancer predictors. 143
Although this Article focuses on breast cancer genetic testing, the analysis
can extend to not only other hereditary diseases but also to other technology.
The “nearly perfectly accurate” results of the BRCA1 variation CRISPR study
as related to breast cancer predictors is a promising start, for both the
classification of future BRCA gene variations and the wide array of other
hereditary diseases. 144 Even though the number of people who have received
uncertain genetic testing results has been downplayed by some, with claims that
uncertain results only occur in a minority of genetic tests, it cannot be denied
that even one variation of unknown significance is too many when human lives
are at stake. 145 In addition, the technological advance demonstrated by CRISPR
has essentially guaranteed that the number of identified gene variations will only
continue to grow, illustrating that the identification of variations of unknown
significance is just beginning. While doctors may prefer patient data as opposed
to laboratory data for classifying gene variations as disease predictors, the
confidence of the scientists who conducted the CRISPR study and the
willingness of the FDA to consider scientific sources for clinical data illustrates
a potential shift that could lead to doctor endorsement of this alternative source
of clinical validity. 146
The second component of the proposed regulatory pathway is a requirement
for disclosure of breast cancer predictors as part of the FDA approval process.
140. Id. at 6.
141. See Robertson, supra note 85.
142. Valoir, supra note 1, at 98.
143. Findlay et al., supra note 114, at 217.
144. Shendure et al., supra note 2.
145. See Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data
as Trade Secrets, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 585 (2012). See also Zhang, supra note 3.
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Transforming BRCA gene variations into breast cancer predictors requires as
much data as can be compiled due to the seriousness of the decisions women are
making in light of their test results. 147 Genetic tests should only be made
available when both the companies and the FDA are confident that the tests
provide a scientifically supported disease development risk prediction, and this
requires the collation of breast cancer predictor data in order to ensure both data
accessibility and accuracy. 148 By requiring the disclosure of breast cancer
predictors as part of genetic test approval, the FDA could incentivize companies
to enter the market by lowering the clinical testing barrier to entry based on the
data already available for review and analysis.
If companies could access breast cancer predictors shared by others in the
industry, women could more readily gain access to the entire range of breast
cancer predictors, keeping pace with the advancement of technology. Although
the FDA has been criticized because of industry financial conflicts of interest, it
is the federal regulatory agency that currently has the authority and
responsibility to ensure the safety and effectiveness of genetic tests. 149 As such,
it is in the unique position to make breast cancer predictors accessible via market
incentives. Market incentives can include motivations rooted in private profits
via commercialization, societal improvement, or public safety. 150 In addition,
the requirement to share breast cancer predictors as part of FDA approval would
remove the trade secrecy disadvantage caused by Myriad’s proprietary breast
cancer predictor data. By requiring disclosure of breast cancer predictors, in
addition to allowing for the use of laboratory data in the classification of these
predictors, the FDA would be strengthening the incentive for companies to enter
the genetic testing market through the provision of not one but two sources of
clinical testing cost offset. If women are going to gain access to breast cancer
predictors, they need companies to pursue this market.
The required disclosure of breast cancer predictor data incentivizes
accessibility more than public databases because the current public databases
depend on the voluntary sharing of data in order to make correlations between
gene variations and disease development risk. 151 Voluntary sharing of data is
just not enough for the women and health care providers who need access to
breast cancer predictors in order to make informed treatment decisions, as this
voluntary sharing has led to multiple databases with inconsistent and variable
data from which it is difficult to extract reliable information. 152 Similarly, health
care payors are also not the solution for data disclosure, as there are hundreds of
147. Michael J. Malinowski et al., Commercialization of Genetic Testing Services: The FDA,
Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1248 (1997).
148. Id. at 1219.
149. Zettler et al., supra note 17; Dukes et al., supra note 45, at 1.
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existing contracts between genetic testing firms and health care payors that do
not require this disclosure. 153 If the need for accessible breast cancer predictors
cannot depend on voluntarily shared research or health care payor contracts, this
places the FDA at a crucial junction to meet this need. Additionally, the FDA
would not need to start from scratch for a breast cancer predictor database
because it could utilize an existing partnership with the National Institutes of
Health in order to develop the needed database infrastructure. 154
This proposed solution of a single regulatory pathway for all genetic tests is
the first step in the delivery of innovative health care to patients afflicted with
hereditary diseases. While this Article does not address the affordability of this
innovation, relevant to both patients and society at large, innovation starts with
incentive. Incentive is not limited to private profits but also includes a
motivation to improve society and further public safety. 155 In order for breast
cancer predictors to be accessible to the women who need them, companies need
the incentive to enter the genetic testing market and this Article examines how
proprietary rights and regulation can impact this incentive and, ultimately,
patient access. Accessibility of breast cancer predictors requires a solution to
overcome these impediments to innovation and the solution in this Article is a
good place to start.
V. CONCLUSION
There are millions of women at risk of developing breast cancer in the
United States and over one million women have already undergone genetic
testing of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in order to determine whether they are
at risk of disease development due to variations in these genes. 156 There is
clearly patient interest in breast cancer genetic testing, but accurate genetic
testing requires companies to produce and market genetic tests that utilize the
entire range of breast cancer predictors. While the CRISPR technology has been
used to not only identify thousands of BRCA1 gene variations but also
accurately classify these variations as breast cancer predictors, proprietary rights
and regulation are stopping companies from utilizing this technological advance
to provide women the accurate genetic tests they need. 157 Therefore, a single
regulatory pathway is needed for all genetic tests that balances the requirement
of clinical validity with the supplementation of patient data, by technology such
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as CRISPR, in order to overcome the inaccessibility of breast cancer predictors
due to proprietary rights protection.
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